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Abstract
Using results from convex analysis, we investigate a novel approach to identification
and estimation of discrete choice models which we call the “Mass Transport Approach”
(MTA). We show that the conditional choice probabilities and the choice-specific payoffs
in these models are related in the sense of conjugate duality, and that the identification
problem is a mass transport problem. Based on this, we propose a new two-step esti-
mator for these models; interestingly, the first step of our estimator involves solving a
linear program which is identical to the classic assignment (two-sided matching) game
of Shapley and Shubik (1971). The application of convex-analytic tools to dynamic dis-
crete choice models, and the connection with two-sided matching models, is new in the
literature.
Key words: Dynamic discrete choice models; Convex analysis; Mass Transport Approach
(MTA)
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1 Introduction
Empirical research utilizing dynamic discrete choice models of economic decision-making
has flourished in recent decades, with applications in all areas of applied microeconomics
including labor economics, industrial organization, public finance, and health economics.
The existing literature on the identification and estimation of these models has recognized
a close link between the conditional choice probabilities (hereafter, CCP, which can be
observed and estimated from the data) and the payoffs (or choice-specific value functions,
which are unobservable to the researcher); indeed, most estimation procedures contain
an “inversion” step in which the choice-specific value functions are recovered given the
estimated choice probabilities.
This paper has two contributions. First, we explicitly characterize this duality re-
lationship between the choice probabilities and choice-specific payoffs. Specifically, in
discrete choice models, the social surplus function (McFadden (1978)) provides us with
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the mapping from payoffs to the probabilities with which a choice is chosen at each state
(conditional choice probabilities). Recognizing that the social surplus function is convex,
we develop the idea that the convex conjugate of the social surplus function gives us the
inverse mapping - from choice probabilities to utility indices. More precisely, the subdif-
ferential of the convex conjugate is a correspondence that maps from the observed choice
probabilities to an identified set of payoffs. In short, the choice probabilities and utility
indices are related in the sense of conjugate duality. The discovery of this relationship
allows us to succinctly characterize the empirical content of discrete choice models, both
static and dynamic.
Not only is the convex conjugate of the social surplus function a useful theoretical
object; it also provides a new and practical way to “invert” from a given vector of choice
probabilities back to the underlying utility indices which generated these probabilities.
This is the second contribution of this paper. We show how the conjugate along with its
set of subgradients can be efficiently computed by means of linear programming. This
linear programming formulation has the structure of an optimal assignment problem
(as in Shapley-Shubik’s (1971) classic work). This surprising connection enables us to
apply insights developed in the optimal transport literature, e.g. Villani (2003, 2009), to
discrete choice models. We call this new methodology the “Mass Transport Approach”
to CCP inversion.
This paper focuses on the estimation of dynamic discrete-choice models via two-step
estimation procedures in which conditional choice probabilities are estimated in the initial
stage; this estimation approach was pioneered in Hotz and Miller (HM, 1993) and Hotz,
Miller, Sanders, Smith (1994).1 Our use of tools and concepts from convex analysis to
study identification and estimation in this dynamic discrete choice setting is novel in the
literature. Based on our findings, we propose a new two-step estimator for DDC models.
A nice feature of our estimator is that it works for practically any assumed distribution
of the utility shocks.2 Thus, our estimator would make possible the task of evaluating
the robustness of estimation to different distributional assumptions.3
1Subsequent contributions include Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007), Magnac and Thesmar
(2002), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Bajari, et. al. (2009), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011),
and Norets and Tang (2013).
2While existing identification results for dynamic discrete choice models allow for quite general spec-
ifications of the additive choice-specific utility shocks, many applications of these two-step estimators
maintain the restrictive assumption that the utility shocks are distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value,
independently of the state variables, leading to choice probabilities which take the multinomial logit
form.
3We also note that, while they are not the focus in this paper, many applications of dynamic choice
models do not utilize HM-type two step estimation procedures, and they allow for quite flexible dis-
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Section 2 contains our main results regarding duality between choice probabilities and
payoffs in discrete choice models. Based on these results, we propose, in Section 3, a
two-step estimation approach for these models. We also emphasize here the surprising
connection between dynamic discrete-choice and optimal matching models. In Section
4 we discuss computational details for our estimator, focusing on the use of linear pro-
gramming to compute (approximately) the convex conjugate function from the dynamic
discrete-choice model. Monte Carlo experiments (in Section 5) show that our estimator
performs well in practice, and we apply the estimator to Rust’s (1987) bus engine re-
placement data (Section 6). Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs and also
a brief primer on relevant results from convex analysis. Note that Sections 2.2 and 2.3,
as well as Section 4, are not specific to dynamic discrete choice problems but are also
true for any (static) discrete choice model.
2 Basic Model
2.1 The framework
In this section we review the basic dynamic discrete-choice setup, as encapsulated in
Rust’s (1987) seminal paper. The state variable is x ∈ X which we assume to take
only a finite number of values. Agents choose actions y ∈ Y from a finite space Y =
{0, 1, . . . , D}. The single-period utility flow which an agent derives from choosing y in a
given period is
u¯y (x) + εy
where εy denotes the utility shock pertaining to action y, which differs across agents.
Across agents and time periods, the set of utility shocks ε ≡ (εy)y∈Y is distributed
according to a joint distribution function Q(· · · ;x) which can depend on the current
values of the state variable x. We assume that this distribution Q is known to the
researcher.
Throughout, we consider a stationary setting in which the agent’s decision environ-
ment remains unchanged across time periods; thus, for any given period, we use primes
(′) to denote next-period values. Following Rust (1987), and most of the subsequent
papers in this literature, we maintain the following conditional independence assumption
tributions of the utility shocks, and also for serial correlation in these shocks (examples include Pakes
(1986) and Keane and Wolpin (1997)). This literature typically employs simulated method of moments,
or simulated maximum likelihood for estimation (see Rust (1994, section 3.3)).
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(which rules out serially persistent forms of unobserved heterogeneity4):
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence). (x, ε) evolves across time periods as a con-
trolled first-order Markov process, with transition
Pr(x′, ε′|y, x, ε) =Pr(ε′|x′, y, x, ε) · Pr(x′|y, x, ε)
=Pr(ε′|x′) · Pr(x′|y, x).
The discount rate is β. Agents are dynamic optimizers whose choices each period
satisfy5
y ∈ arg max
y˜∈Y
{
u¯ (y˜, x) + εy˜ + βE
[
V¯ (x′, ε′) |x, y˜]} , (1)
where, under standard conditions, the value function V¯ is recursively defined as
V¯ (x, ε) = max
y˜∈Y
{
u¯ (y˜, x) + εy˜ + βE
[
V¯ (x′, ε′) |x, y˜]} .
V (x), the ex-ante value function, is defined as:
V (x) = E
[
V¯ (x, ε) |x] .
The expectation above is conditional on the current state x. In the literature, V (x)
is called the ex-ante (or integrated) value function, because it measures the continuation
value of the dynamic optimization problem before the agent observes his shocks ε, so
that the optimal action is still stochastic from the agent’s point of view.
Next we define the choice-specific value functions as consisting of two terms: the
per-period utility flow and the discounted continuation payoff:
wy(x) ≡ u¯y(x) + βE [V (x′)|x, y)] .
Given these preliminaries, we derive the duality which is central to this paper.
2.2 The social surplus function and its convex conjugate
We start by introducing the expected indirect utility of a decision maker facing the
|Y|-dimensional vector of choice-specific values w:
G (w;x) = E
[
max
y∈Y
(wy(x) + εy) |x
]
(2)
4See Norets (2009), Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), and Hu and Shum
(2012).
5We have used Assumption 1 to eliminate ε as a conditioning variable in the expectation in Eq. (1).
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where the expectation is assumed to be finite and is taken over the distribution of the
utility shocks, Q(·;x). This function G(·;x) : R|Y| → R, is called the “social surplus
function” in McFadden’s (1978) random utility framework, and can be interpreted as the
expected welfare of a representative agent in the dynamic discrete-choice problem.
For convenience in what follows, we introduce the notation Y (w, ε) to denote an
agent’s optimal choice given the vector of choice-specific value functions w and the vector
of utility shocks ε; that is, Y (w, ε) = argmaxy∈Y(wy + εy).
6 This notation makes explicit
the randomness in the optimal alternative (arising from the utility shocks ε). We get
G (w;x) = E [wY (w,ε)(x) + εY (w,ε)|x] = ∑
y∈Y
Pr(Y (w(x), ε) = y|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡py(x)
(wy + E[εy|Y (w, ε) = y, x])
(3)
which shows an alternative expression for the social surplus function as a weighted aver-
age, where the weights are the components of the vector of conditional choice probabilities
p(x). For the remainder of this section, we suppress the dependence of all quantities on
x for convenience. In later sections, we will reintroduce this dependence when it is
necessary.
In the case when the social surplus function G(w) is differentiable (which holds for most
discrete-choice model specifications considered in the literature7), we obtain a well-known
fact that the vector of choice probabilities p compatible with rational choice coincides
with the gradient of G at w:
Proposition 1 (The Williams-Daly-Zachary (WDZ) Theorem).
p = ∇G(w).
This result, which is analogous to Roy’s Identity in discrete choice models, is ex-
pounded in McFadden (1978) and Rust (1994; Thm. 3.1)). It characterizes the vector of
choice probabilities corresponding to optimal behavior in a discrete choice model as the
gradient of the social surplus function. For completeness, we include a proof in the Ap-
pendix. The WDZ theorem provides a mapping from the choice-specific value functions
(which are unobserved by researchers) to the observed choice probabilities p.
However, the identification problem consists in the reverse problem, namely to deter-
mine the set of w which would lead to a given vector of choice probabilities. This problem
6Note that we use w and ε (and also p below) to denote vectors, while wy and εy (and py) denote
the y-th component of these vectors.
7This includes logit, nested logit, multinomial probit, etc. in which the distribution of the utility
shocks is absolutely continuous and w is bounded, cf. Lemma 1 in Shi, Shum and Wong (2014).
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is exactly solved by convex duality and the introduction of the convex conjugate of G,
which we denote as G∗:8
Definition 1 (Convex Conjugate). We define G∗, the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate func-
tion of G (a convex function), by
G∗ (p) = sup
w∈RY
{∑
y∈Y
pywy − G (w)
}
. (4)
Note that Equation (4) above has the property that if p is not a probability, that is
if either conditions py ≥ 0 or
∑
y∈Y py = 1 do not hold, then G∗ (p) = +∞. Because
the choice-specific value functions w and the choice probabilities p are, respectively,
the arguments of the functions G and its convex conjugate function G∗, we say that
w and p are related in the sense of conjugate duality. The theorem below states an
implication of this duality, and provides an “inverse” correspondence from the observed
choice probabilities back to the unobserved w, which is a necessary step for identification
and estimation.
Theorem 1. The following pair of equivalent statements identifies (wy):
(i) p is in the subdifferential of G at w
p ∈ ∂G (w) , (5)
(ii) w is in the subdifferential of G∗ at p
w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) . (6)
The definition and properties of the subdifferential of a convex function are provided
in Appendix A.9 Part (i) is, of course, connected to the WDZ theorem above; indeed,
it is the WDZ theorem when G(w) is differentiable at w. Hence, it encapsulates an
optimality requirement that the vector of observed choice probabilities p be derived from
optimal discrete-choice decision making for some unknown vector w of choice-specific
value functions.
8Details of convex conjugates are expounded in the Appendix. Convex conjugates are also encountered
in production theory. When f is the convex cost function of the firm (decreasing returns to scale in
production), then the convex conjugate of the cost function, f∗, is in fact the firm’s optimal profit
function.
9G is differentiable at w if and only if ∂G(w) is single-valued. In that case, part (i) of Th. 1 reduces
to p = ∇G(w), which is the WDZ theorem. If, in addition, ∇G is one-to-one, then we immediately
get w = (∇G)−1 (p), or ∇G∗(p) = (∇G)−1 (p), which is the case of the classical Legendre transform.
However, as we show below, ∇G(w) is not typically one-to-one in discrete choice models, so that the
statement in part (ii) of Th. 1 is more suitable.
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Part (ii) of this proposition, which describes the “inverse” mapping from conditional
choice probabilities to choice-specific value functions, does not appear to have been ex-
ploited in the literature on dynamic discrete choice. It relates to Galichon and Salanie´
(2012) who use convex analysis to estimate matching games with transferable utilities.
It specifically states that the vector of choice-specific value functions can be identified
from the corresponding vector of observed choice probabilities p as the subgradient of
the convex conjugate function G∗(p). Eq. (6) is also constructive, and suggests a proce-
dure for computing the choice-specific value functions corresponding to observed choice
probabilities. We will fully elaborate this procedure in subsequent sections10.
Appendix A contains additional derivations related to the subgradient of a convex
function. Specifically, it is known (Eq. (25)) that G(w) +G∗(p) = ∑y∈Y pywy if and only
if p ∈ ∂G(w). Combining this with Eq. (3), we obtain an alternative expression for the
convex conjugate function G∗:
G∗(p) = −
∑
y
pyE[εy|Y (w, ε) = y], (7)
corresponding to the weighted expectations of the utility shocks εy conditional on choos-
ing the option y. It is also known that the subdifferential ∂G∗(p) corresponds with the
set of maximizers in the program (4) which define the conjugate function G∗(p); that
is,
w ∈ G∗(p) ⇔ w ∈ argmaxw∈RY
{∑
y∈Y
pywy − G (w)
}
. (8)
Later, we will exploit this variational representation of the subdifferential G∗(p) for com-
putational purposes; cf. Section 4 below.
Example 1 (Logit). Before proceeding, we discuss the logit model, for which the func-
tions and relations above reduce to familiar expressions. When the distribution Q of ε
obeys an extreme value type I distribution, it follows from Extreme Value theory that
G and G∗ can be obtained in closed form11: G (w) = log(∑y∈Y exp(wy)) + γ, while
G∗ (p) = ∑y∈Y py log py − γ if p belongs in the interior of the simplex, G∗ (p) = +∞
otherwise. Recall that γ ≈ 0.57 is Euler’s constant. Hence in this case, G∗ is the entropy
10Clearly, Theorem 1 also applies to static random utility discrete-choice models, with the w(x) being
interpreted as the utility indices for each of the choices. As such, Eq. (6) relates to results regarding
the invertibility of the mapping from utilities to choice probabilities in static discrete choice models
(e.g. Berry (1994); Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2008); Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2013)). Similar
results have also arisen in the literature on stochastic learning in games (Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002);
Cominetti, Melo and Sorin (2010)).
11Relatedly, Arcidiacono and Miller (2011, pp. 1839-1841) discuss computational and analytical solu-
tions for the G∗ function in the generalized extreme value setting.
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of distribution p; see Anderson, de Palma, Thisse (1988) and references therein. The sub-
differential of G∗ is characterized as follows: w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) if and only if wy = log py −K,
for some K ∈ R. In this logit case the convex conjugate function G∗ is the entropy of
distribution p, which explains why it can be called a generalized entropy function even in
non-logit contexts. 
2.3 Identification
It follows from Theorem 1 that the identification of systematic utilities boils down to
the problem of computing the subgradient of a generalized entropy function. However,
from examining the social surplus function G, we see that if w ∈ ∂G∗ (p), then it is
also true that w − K ∈ ∂G∗ (p), where K ∈ R|Y| is a vector taking values of K across
all Y components. Indeed, the choice probabilities are only affected by the differences
in the levels offered by the various alternatives. In what follows, we shall tackle this
indeterminacy problem by isolating a particular w0 among those satisfying w ∈ ∂G∗ (p),
where we choose
G (w0) = 0. (9)
We will impose the following assumption on the heterogeneity.
Assumption 2 (Full Support). Assume the distribution Q of the vector of utility shocks
ε is such that the distribution of the vector (εy − ε1)y 6=1 has full support.
Under this assumption, Theorem 2 below shows that Eq. (9) defines w0 uniquely.
Theorem 3 will then show that the knowledge of w0 allows for easy recovery of all vectors
w satisfying p ∈ ∂G (w).
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 2, let p be in the interior of the simplex ∆|Y|, (i.e.
py > 0 for each y and
∑
y py = 1). Then there exists a unique w
0 ∈ ∂G∗ (p) such that
G (w0) = 0.
The proof of this theorem is in the Appendix. Moreover, even when Assumption 2 is
not satisfied, w0 will still be set-identified; Theorem 4 below describes the identified set
of w0 corresponding to a given vector of choice probabilities p.
Our next result is our main tool for identification; it shows that our choice of w0(x), as
defined in Eq. (9) is without loss of generality; it is not an additional model restriction,
but merely a convenient way of representing all w(x) in ∂G∗ (p (x)) with respect to a
natural and convenient reference point.12
12This indeterminacy issue has been resolved in the existing literature on dynamic discrete choice
models (eg. Hotz and Miller (1993), Rust (1994), Magnac and Thesmar (2002) by focusing on the
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Theorem 3. Maintain Assumption 2, and let K denote any scalar K ∈ R. The set of
conditions
w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) and G (w) = K
is equivalent to
wy = w
0
y +K, ∀y ∈ Y .
This theorem shows that any vector within the set ∂G∗ (p) can be characterized as
the sum of the (uniquely-determined, by Theorem 3) vector w0 and a constant K ∈
R. As we will see below, this is our invertibility result for dynamic discrete choice
problems, as it will imply unique identification of the vector of choice-specific value
functions corresponding to any observed vector of conditional choice probabilities.13
2.4 Empirical Content of Dynamic Discrete Choice Model
To summarize the empirical content of the model, we recall the fact that the ex-ante
value function V solves the following equation
V (x) =
∑
y∈Y
py (x)
(
u¯y (x) + E[εy|Y (w, ε) = y, x] + β
∑
x′
p (x′|x, y)V (x′)
)
(derived in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), among others), where we write
p(x′|x, y) = Pr(xt+1 = x′|xt = x, yt = y). Noting that the choice-specific value function
is just
wy(x) = u¯y (x) + β
∑
x′
p (x′|x, y)V (x′) , (10)
and, comparing with Eq. (3),
V (x) = G (w(x);x) and p (x) ∈ ∂G (w(x);x) .
Hence, by Theorem 3, the true w (x) will differ from w0(x) by a constant term
V (x):
w(x) = w0 (x) + V (x)
differences between choice-specific value functions, which is equivalent to setting wy0(x), the choice-
specific value function for a benchmark choice y0, equal to zero. Compared to this, our choice of w
0(x)
satisfying G(w0(x)) = 0 is more convenient in our context, as it leads to a simple expression for the
constant K (see Section 2.4).
13See Berry (1994), Chiappori and Komunjer (2010), Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2012), among others,
for conditions ensuring the invertibility or “univalence” of demand systems stemming from multinomial
choice models, under settings more general than the random utility framework considered here.
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where w0 (x) is defined in Theorem 2. This result is also convenient for identification
purposes, as it separates identification of w into two subproblems, the determination
of w0 and the determination of V . Once w0 and V are known, the utility flows are
determined from Eq. (10). This motivates our two-step estimation procedure, which we
describe next.
3 The Mass Transport (MTA) Estimator
Based upon the derivations in the previous section, we present a two-step estimation
procedure. In the first step, we use the results from Theorem 3 to recover the vector
of choice-specific value functions w0(x) corresponding to each observed vector of choice
probabilities p(x). In the second step, we recover the utility flow functions u¯y(x) given
the w0(x) obtained from the first step.
3.1 First step
In the first step, the goal is to recover the vector of choice-specific value functions w0(x) ∈
∂G∗(p(x)) corresponding to the vector of observed choice probabilities p(x) for each value
of x. In doing this, we use Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 above, which show how w0(x)
belongs to the subdifferential of the conjugate function G∗(p (x)). We delay discussion
these details until Section 4. There, we will show how this problem of obtaining w0(x)
can be reformulated in terms of a class of mathematical programming problems, the
Monge-Kantorovich mass transport problems, which leads to convenient computational
procedures. Since this is the central component of our estimation procedure, we have
named it the mass transport approach (MTA).
3.2 Second step
From the first step, we obtained w0(x) such that w(x) = w0(x)+V (x). Now in the second
step, we use the recursive structure of the dynamic model, along with fixing one of the
utility flows, to jointly pin down the values of w(x) and V (x). Finally, once w(x) and V (x)
are known, the utility flows can be obtained from u¯y (x) = wy(x)− βE [V (x′)|x, y].
In order to nonparametrically identify u¯y (x), we need to fix some values of the utility
flows. Following Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2009), we fix the utility
flow corresponding to a benchmark choice y0 to be constant at zero:
14
14In a static discrete-choice setting (i.e. β = 0), this assumption would be a normalization, and
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Assumption 3 (Fix utility flow for benchmark choice). ∀x, u¯y0 (x) = 0.
With this assumption, we get
0 = w0y0(x) + V (x)− βE [V (x′) |x, y = y0] . (11)
Let W be the column vector whose general term is
(
w0y0(x)
)
x∈X , let V be the column
vector whose general term is (V (x))x∈X , and let Π
0 be the |X |×|X | matrix whose general
term Π0ij is Pr (xt+1 = j|xt = i, y = y0). Equation (11), rewritten in matrix notation,
is
W = βΠ0V − V
and for β < 1, matrix I − βΠ0 is a diagonally dominant matrix. Hence, it is invertible
and Equation (11) becomes
V = (βΠ0 − I)−1W. (12)
The right hand side of this equation is uniquely estimated from the data. After
obtaining V (x), u¯y(x) can be nonparametrically identified by
u¯y(x) = w
0
y(x) + V (x)− βE[V (x′)|x, y], (13)
where w0 (x) is as in Theorem 3, and V is given by (12).
As a sanity check, one recovers u¯y0(.) = W + V − βΠ0V = 0. Also, when β → 0, one
recovers u¯y(x) = w
0
y(x)−w0y0(x) which is the case in standard static discrete choice.
Eqs. (12) and (13) above, showing how the per-period utility flows can be recovered
from the choice-specific value functions via a system of linear equations, echoes similar
derivations in the existing literature (e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011, 2013)). Hence, the innovative
aspect of our MTA estimator lies not in the second step, but rather in the first step. In
the next section, we delve into computational aspects of this first step.
Existing procedures for estimating DDC models typically rely on a small class of
distributions for the utility shocks – primarily those in the extreme-value family, as
in Example 1 above – because these distributions yield analytical (or near-analytical)
formulas for the choice probabilities and {E[εy|Y (w, ε) = y, x]}y, the vector of conditional
expectation of the utility shocks for the optimal choices, which is required in order to
without loss of generality. In a dynamic discrete-choice setting, however, this entails some loss of
generality because different values for the utility flows imply different values for the choice-specific value
functions, which leads to differences in the optimal choice behavior. Norets and Tang (2013) discuss this
issue in greater detail.
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recover the utility flows15. Our approach, however, which is based on computing the
G∗ function, easily accommodates different choices for Qε, the (joint) distribution of
the utility shocks conditional on X. Therefore, our findings expand the set of dynamic
discrete-choice models suitable for applied work far beyond those with extreme-value
distributed utility shocks.16
4 Computational details for the MTA estimator
In Section 3.1, we show that the problem of identification in DDC models can be for-
mulated as an mass transport problem. In this section, we consider how this may be
implemented in practice. In showing how to compute G∗, we exploit the connection,
alluded to above, between this function and the assignment game, a model of two-sided
matching with transferable utility which has been used to model marriage and housing
markets (such as Shapley and Shubik (1971) and Becker (1973)).
4.1 Mass Transport formulation
Much of our computational strategy will be based on the following proposition, which was
derived in Galichon and Salanie´ (2012, Proposition 2). It characterizes the G∗ function
as an optimum of a well-studied mathematical program: the “mass transport,”problem,
see Villani (2003).
Proposition 2 (Galichon and Salanie´). Given Assumption (2), the function G∗(p) is
the value of the mass transport problem in which the distribution Q of vectors of utility
shocks ε is matched optimally to the distribution of actions y given by the multinomial
distribution p, when the cost associated to a match of (ε, y) is given by
c (y, ε) = −εy
15Related papers include Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz, Miller, Sanders, Smith (1994), Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). Norets and
Tang (2013) propose another estimation approach for binary dynamic choice models in which the choice
probability function is not required to be known.
16This remark is also relevant for static discrete choice models. In fact, the random-coefficients multi-
nomial demand model of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) does not have a closed-form expression
for the choice probabilities, thus necessitating a simulation-based inversion procedure. In ongoing work
(Chiong, Galichon, Shum (2013)), we are exploring the estimation of random-coefficients discrete-choice
demand models using our approach.
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where εy is the utility shock from taking the y-th action. That is,
G∗ (p) = sup
w,z
s.t. wy+z(ε)≤c(y,ε)
{Ep [wY ] + EQ [z (ε)]} , (14)
where the supremum is taken over the pair (w, z), where wy is a vector of dimension
|Y| and z(·) is a Q-measurable random variable. By Monge-Kantorovich duality, (14)
coincides with its dual
G∗ (p) = min
Y∼p
ε∼Q
E [c (Y, ε)] , (15)
where the minimum is taken over the joint distribution of (Y, ε) such that the the first
margin Y has distribution p and the second margin ε has distribution Q. Moreover,
w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) if and only if there exists z such that (w, z) solves (14). Finally, w0 ∈ ∂G∗ (p)
and G(w0) = 0 if and only if there exists z such that (w0, z) solves (14) and z is such
that EQ [z (ε)] = 0.
In Eq. (15) above, the minimum is taken across all joint distributions of (Y, ε) with
marginal distribution equal to, respectively, p and Q. It follows from the proposition that
the main problem of identification of the choice-specific value functions w can be recast
as a mass transport problem (Villani (2003)), in which the set of optimizers to Eq. (14)
yield vectors of choice-specific value functions w ∈ ∂G∗ (p).
Moreover, the mass transport problem can be interpreted as an optimal matching
problem. Using a marriage market analogy, consider a setting in which a matched couple
consisting of a “man” (with characteristics y ∼ p) and a “woman” (with characteristics
ε ∼ Q) obtain a joint marital surplus −c(y, ε) = εy. Accordingly, Eq. (15) is an optimal
matching problem in which the joint distribution of characteristics (y, ε) of matched
couples is chosen to maximize the aggregate marital surplus.
In the case when Q is a discrete distribution, the mass transport problem in the
above proposition reduces to a linear-programming problem which coincides with the
assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1971). This connection suggests a convenient
way for efficiently computing the G∗ function (along with its subgradient). Specifically,
we will show how the dual problem (Eq. (15)) takes the form of a linear programming
problem or assignment game, for which some of the associated Lagrange multipliers
correspond to the the subgradient ∂G∗, and hence the choice-specific value functions.
These computational details are the focus of Section 4 below. We include the proof of
Proposition 2 in the Appendix for completeness.
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4.2 Linear programming computation
Let Qˆ be a discrete approximation to the distribution Q. Specifically, consider a S-point
approximation to Q, where the support is Supp(Qˆ) = {ε1, . . . , εS}. Let Pr(Qˆ = εs) = qs.
The best S-point approximation is such that the support points are equally weighted,
qs =
1
S
, i.e. the best Qˆ is a uniform distribution, see Kennan (2006). Therefore, let Qˆ
be a uniform distribution whose support can be constructed by drawing S points from
the distribution Q. It is also known that Qˆ converges to Q uniformly as S →∞, so that
the approximation error from this discretization will vanish when S is large. Under these
assumptions, Problem (14)-(15) has a Linear Programming formulation as
max
pi≥0
∑
y,s
piysε
s
y (16)
S∑
s=1
piys = py, ∀y ∈ Y (17)∑
y∈Y
piys = qs, ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S} . (18)
For this discretized problem, the set of w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) is the set of vectors (w)y of
Lagrange multipliers corresponding to constraints (17). To see how we recover w0, the
specific element in ∂G∗ (p) as defined in Theorem 1, we begin with the dual problem
min
λ,z
∑
y∈Y
pyλy +
S∑
s=1
qszs (19)
s.t. λy + zs ≥ εsy
Consider (λ, z) a solution to (19). By duality, λ and z are, respectively, vectors of La-
grange multipliers associated to constraints (17) and (18).17 We have G∗ (p) = ∑y∈Y pyλy+∑S
s=1 qszs, which implies
18 that G (λ) = −∑Ss=1 qszs. Also, for any two elements λ,w0 ∈
∂G∗(p), we have ∑y∈Y pyλy − G(λ) = ∑y∈Y pyw0y − G(w0).
Hence, because G(w0) = 0, we get
w0y = λy − G (λ) = λy +
S∑
s=1
qszs. (20)
In Theorem 5 below, we establish the consistency of this estimate of w0.
17Because the two linear programs (16) and (19) are dual to each other, the Lagrange multipliers of
interest λy can be obtained by computing either program. In practice, for the simulations and empirical
application below, we computed the primal problem (16).
18This uses Eq. (25) in Appendix A, which (in our setup) states that G∗(p) + G(λ) = p · λ, for all
Lagrange multiplier vectors λ ∈ ∂G∗(p).
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4.3 Discretization of Q and a second type of indeterminacy is-
sue
Thus far, we have proposed a procedure for computing G∗ (and the choice-specific value
functions w0) by discretizing the otherwise continuous distribution Q. However, because
the support of ε is discrete, w0y will generally not be unique.
19 This is due to the non-
uniqueness of the solution to the dual of the LP problem in Eq. (16), and corresponds
to Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) well-known results on the multiplicity of the core in
the finite assignment game. Applied to discrete-choice models, it implies that when the
support of the utility shocks is finite, the utilities from the discrete-choice model will
only be partially identified. In this section, we discuss this partial identification, or
indeterminacy, problem further.
Recall that
G∗ (p) = sup
wy+z(ε)≤c(y,ε)
{Ep [wY ] + EQ [z (ε)]} (21)
where c (y, ε) = −εy. In Proposition 2, this problem was shown to be the dual formulation
of an optimal assignment problem.
We call identified set of payoff vectors, denoted by I (p), the set of vectors w such
that
Pr
(
wy + εy ≥ max
y′
{wy′ + εy′}
)
= py (22)
and we denote by I0 (p) the normalized identified set of payoff vectors, that is the set
of w ∈ I (p) such that G (w) = 0. Note that if Q were to have full support, I0 (p)
would contain only the singleton {w0} as in Theorem 3. Instead, when the distribution
Q is discrete, the set I0 (p) contains a multiplicity of vectors w which satisfy (5). One
has:
Theorem 4. The following holds:
(i) The set I (p) coincides with the set of w such that there exists z such that (w, z)
is a solution to (21). Thus
I (p) =
{
w : ∃z, wy + zε ≤ c (y, ε)
Ep [wY ] + EQ [zε] = G∗ (p)
}
.
(ii) The set I0 (p) is determined by the following set of linear inequalities
I0 (p) =
w : ∃z,
wy + zε ≤ c (y, ε)
Ep [wY ] = G∗ (p)
EQ [zε] = 0
 .
19Note that Theorem 1 requires ε to have full support.
17
This result allows us to easily derive identification bounds using the characterization
of the identified set using linear inequalities. Indeed, for each y ∈ Y , we can obtain upper
(resp. lower) bounds on wy by maximizing (resp. minimizing) wy subject to the linear
inequalities characterizing I0(p), which is a linear programming problem.20
Furthermore, when the dimensionality of discretization (S) is high, the core typically
shrinks to a singleton, and the core collapses to {w0}.21 In our Monte Carlo experiments
below, we provide evidence for the magnitude of this indeterminacy problem under dif-
ferent levels of discretization.
4.4 Consistency of MTA estimator
Here we show (strong) consistency for our MTA estimator of w0, the normalized choice-
specific value functions. In our proof, we accommodate two types of error: (i) approxi-
mation error from discretizing the distribution Q of ε, and (ii) sampling error from our
finite-sample observations of the choice probabilities. We use Qn to denote the discretized
distributions of ε, and pn to denote the sample estimates of the choice probabilities. The
limiting vector of choice probabilities is denoted p0. For a given (Qn, pn), let wny denote
the choice-specific value functions estimated using our MTA approach.
Theorem 5. Assume:
(i) The sequence of vectors
{
pny
}
y∈Y , viewed as the multinomial distribution of y,
converges weakly to p0;
(ii) The discretized distributions of ε converge weakly to Q: Qn
d→ Q;
(iii) The second moments of Qn are uniformly bounded.
Then the convergence wny → w0y for each y ∈ Y holds almost surely.
The proof, which is in the appendix, may be of independent interest as the main
argument relies on approximation results from mass transport theory, which we believe
to be the first use of such results for proving consistency in an econometrics context.
20Moreover, partial identification in w0 (due to discretization of the shock distribution Q(ε) will
naturally also imply partial identification in the utility flows u0. For a given identified vector w0 (and
also given the choice probabilities p and transition mastrix Π0 from the data), we can recover the
corresponding u0 using Eqs. (12)-(13).
21A detailed discussion of this phenomenon is provided in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999).
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5 Monte Carlo Evidence
In this section, we illustrate our estimation framework using a dynamic model of resource
extraction. To illustrate how our method can tractably handle any general distribution of
the unobservables, we use a distribution in which shocks to different choices are correlated.
We will begin by describing the setup.
At each time t, let xt ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20} be the state variable denoting the size of the
resource pool. There are three choices,
yt = 1 The pool of resources is extracted fully. xt+1|xt, yt = 1 follows a multinomial
distribution on {1, 2, 3, 4} with parameter pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4). The utility flow is
u¯(yt = 1, xt) = 0.5
√
xt − 2 + ε1.
yt = 2 The pool of resources is extracted partially. xt+1|xt, yt = 2 follows a multinomial
distribution on {max{1, xt − 10},max{2, xt − 9},max{3, xt − 8},max{4, xt − 7}}
with parameter pi. The utility flow is u¯(yt = 2, xt) = 0.4
√
xt − 2 + ε1.
yt = 3 Agent waits for the pool to grow and does not extract. xt+1|xt, yt = 3 follows a
multinomial distribution on {xt, xt + 1, xt + 2, xt + 3} with parameter pi. We fixed
the utility flow to be u¯(yt = 3, xt) = ε2.
The joint distribution of the unobserved state variables is given by (ε1− ε3, ε2− ε3) ∼
N
((
0
0
)
,
(
0.5 0.5
0.5 1
))
. Other parameters we fix and hold constant for the Monte Carlo
study are the discount rate, β = 0.9 and pi = (0.3, 0.35, 0.25, 0.10).
5.1 Asymptotic performance
As a preliminary check of our estimation procedure, we show that we are able to recover
the utility flows using the actual conditional choice probabilities implied by the underlying
model. We discretized the distribution of ε using S = 5000 support points. As is clear
from Figure 1, the estimated utility flows (plotted as dots) as a function of states matched
the actual utility functions very well.
5.2 Finite sample performance
To test the performance of our estimation procedure when there is sampling error in
the CCPs, we generate simulated panel data of the following form: {yit , xit : i =
1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2, . . . , T} where yit ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the dynamically optimal choice
at xit after the realization of simulated shocks. We vary the number of cross-section
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Figure 1: Comparison between the estimated and true utility flows.
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observations N and the number periods T , and for each combination of (N, T ), we
generate 100 independent datasets.22
For each replication or simulated dataset, the root-mean-square error (RMSE) and R2
are calculated, showing how well the estimated u¯y(x) fits the true utility function. The
averages are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Average fit across all replications. Standard deviations are reported in the
Appendix.
Design RMSE(y = 0) RMSE(y = 1) R2(y = 0) R2(y = 1)
N = 100, T = 100 0.5586 0.2435 0.3438 0.7708
N = 100, T = 500 0.1070 0.1389 0.7212 0.9119
N = 100, T = 1000 0.0810 0.1090 0.8553 0.9501
N = 200, T = 100 0.1244 0.1642 0.5773 0.8736
N = 200, T = 200 0.1177 0.1500 0.7044 0.9040
N = 500, T = 100 0.0871 0.1162 0.8109 0.9348
N = 500, T = 500 0.0665 0.0829 0.8899 0.9678
N = 1000, T = 100 0.0718 0.0928 0.8777 0.9647
N = 1000, T = 1000 0.0543 0.0643 0.9322 0.9820
22In each dataset, we initialized xi1 with a random state in X .
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5.3 Size of the identified set of payoffs
As mentioned in Section 4.3, using a discrete approximation to the distribution of the un-
observed state variable introduces a partial identification problem: the identified choice-
specific value functions might not be unique. Using simulations, we next show that the
identified set of choice-specific value functions (which we will simply refer to as “pay-
offs”) shrinks to a singleton as S increases, where S is the number of support points in
the discrete approximation of Q. For S ranging from 100 to 1000, we plot in Figure 2,
the differences between the largest and smallest choice-specific value function for y = 3
across all values of p ∈ ∆3 (using the linear programming procedures described in Section
4.3).23
Figure 2: The identified set of payoffs shrinks to a singleton across ∆3.
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For
each value of S, we plot the values of the differences maxw∈∂G∗(p)w −minw∈∂G∗(p)w across all
values of p ∈ ∆3. In the boxplot, the central mark is the median, the edges of the box are the
25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not
considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually.
As is evident, even at small S, the identified payoffs are very close to each other in
magnitude. At S = 1000, where computation is near-instantaneous, for most of the
values in the discretised grid of ∆3, the core is a singleton; when it is not, the difference
23The analogous plots of the largest and smallest choice-specific value functions for y = 1 and y = 2
are Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix.
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in the estimated payoff is less than 0.01. Similar results hold for the choice-specific value
functions for choices y = 1 and y = 2, which are plotted in the Appendix. To sum up, it
appears that this indeterminacy issue in the payoffs is not a worrisome problem for even
very modest values of S.
5.4 Comparison: MTA vs. Simulated Maximum Likelihood
One common technique used in the literature to estimate dynamic discrete choice models
with non-standard distribution of unobservables is the Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML). Our MTA method has a distinct advantage over SML – while MTA allows the util-
ity flows u¯y(x) for different choices y and states x to be nonparametric, the SML approach
typically requires parameterizing these utility flows as a function of a low-dimensional pa-
rameter vector. This makes comparison of these two approaches awkward. Nevertheless,
here we undertake a comparison of the nonparametric MTA vs. the parametric SML ap-
proach. Given the difference in parametrization between the two estimation approaches,
it does not make sense to compare the accuracy of the parameter estimates; rather we
compare the performance of the two alternative approaches in terms of computational
time. The computations were performed on a Quad Core Intel Xeon 2.93GHz UNIX
workstation, and the results are presented in Table 2.
From a computational point of view, the disadvantage of SML is that the dynamic
programming problem must be solved (via Bellman function iteration) for each trial
parameter vector, whereas the MTA requires solving a large-scale linear programming
problem – but only once. Table 2 shows that the time it takes to estimate the entire
model using MTA is typically equal to the time it takes to perform only a couple of
iterations of the SML procedure. For instance, at S = 5000 (the same value we used
in the Monte Carlo results reported above), we see that the MTA estimation procedure
requires 9.6 seconds, which is less than three times the time it would take to evaluate
just a single iteration of the SML procedure (3.6 seconds). Similar magnitudes obtain
at other values of S. This finding, along with the results in Table 1, show that MTA
has the desirable properties of speed and accuracy, and also allows for nonparametric
specification of the utility flows u¯y(x).
6 Empirical Application: Revisiting Harold Zurcher
In this section, we apply our estimation procedure to the bus engine replacement dataset
first analyzed in Rust (1987). In each week t, Harold Zurcher (bus depot manager),
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Table 2: Comparison: MTA vs. Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML)
S discretized points SML:a MTA:b
Avg. seconds Avg. seconds
2000 2.5 2.6
3000 2.9 4.4
4000 3.2 6.6
5000 3.6 9.6
6000 4.0 13.4
7000 4.3 17.5
8000 4.6 21.5
aIn this column we report time it takes to compute a single iteration of SML. For SML, we consider
a parametric utility flow function, with u¯y=0(x) = θ00 + θ01
√
x, and u¯y=1(x) = θ10 + θ11
√
x.
bIn this column we report the time it takes to fully estimate the model. The utility flows are
nonparametrically specified.
chooses yt ∈ {0, 1} after observing the mileage xt ∈ X and the realized shocks εt. If
yt = 0, then he chooses not to replace the bus engine, and yt = 1 means that he chooses
to replace the bus engine. The states space is X = {0, 1, . . . 29}, that is, we divided the
mileage space into 30 states, each representing a 12,500 increment in mileage since the
last engine replacement.24 Harold Zurcher manages a fleet of 104 identical buses, and
we observe the decisions that he made, as well as the corresponding bus mileage at each
time period t. The duration between t + 1 and t is a quarter of a year, and the dataset
spans 10 years. Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix summarize the frequencies and mileage
at which replacements take place in the dataset.
Firstly, we can directly estimate the probability of choosing to replace and not to
replace the engine for each state in X . Also directly obtained from the data is the Markov
transition probabilities for the observed state variable xt ∈ X, estimated as:
24 This grid is coarser compared to Rust’s (1987) original analysis of this data, in which he divided
the mileage space into increments of 5,000 miles. However, because replacement of engines occurred so
infrequently (there were only 61 replacement in the entire ten-year sample period), using such a fine
grid size leads to many states that have zero probability of choosing replacement. Our procedure –
like all other CCP-based approaches – fails when the vector of conditional choice probability lies on the
boundary of the simplex.
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Figure 3: Estimates of utility flows u¯y=0(x), across values of mileage x
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ǫ ∼ 0.5 · N
(
0,
1
1 + 0.1x
)
+ 0.5 · N (0, 1)’
ǫ ∼ 0.5 · N (0, 1)+ 0.5 · N (0, 1)
Pˆr(xt+1 = j|xt = i, yt = 0) =

0.7405 if j = i
0.2595 if j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
Pˆr(xt+1 = j|xt = i, yt = 1) =

0.7405 if j = 0
0.2595 if j = 1
0 otherwise
For this analysis, we assumed a normal mixture distribution of the error term, specif-
ically, εt0− εt1 ∼ 12N(0, 1) + 12N(0, 11+0.1x).25 We chose this mixture distribution in order
to allow the utility shocks to depend on mileage – which accommodates, for instance, op-
erating costs which may be more volatile and unpredictable at different levels of mileage.
At the same time, these specifications for the utility shock distribution showcase the
25In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where the researcher fully knows the distribution of
the unobservables Q~ε, so that there are no unknown parameters in these distributions. In principle, the
two-step procedure proposed here can be nested inside an additional “outer loop” in which unknown
parameters of Q~ε are considered, but identification and estimation in this case must rely on additional
model restrictions in addition to those considered in this paper. We are currently exploring such a model
in the context of the simpler static discrete choice setting (Chiong, Galichon and Shum (2014, work in
progress)).
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flexibility of our procedure in estimating dynamic discrete choice models for any general
error distribution. For comparison, we repeat this exercise using an error distribution
that is homoskedastic, i.e., its variance does not depend on the state variable xt. The
result appears to be robust to using different distributions of εt0−εt1. We set the discount
rate β = 0.9.
To non-parametrically estimate u¯y=0(x), we fixed u¯y=1(x) to 0 for all x ∈ X. Hence,
our estimates of u¯y=0(x) should be interpreted as the magnitude of operating costs
26
relative to replacement costs27, with positive values implying that replacement costs
exceed operating costs. The estimated utility flows from choosing y = 0 (don’t replace)
relative to y = 1 (replace engine) are plotted in Figure 3. We only present estimates
for mileage within the range x ∈ [9, 25], because within this range, the CCPs are in the
interior of the probability simplex (cf. footnote 24 and Figure 8 in appendix).
Within this range, the estimated utility function does not vary much with increasing
mileages, i.e. it has slope that is not significantly different from zero. The recovered
utilities fall within the narrow band of 9 and 9.5, which implies that on average the
replacement cost is much higher than the maintenance cost, by a magnitude of 18 to 19
times the variance of the utility shocks. It is somewhat surprising that our results suggest
that when the mileage goes beyond the cutoff point of 100,000 miles, Harold Zurcher
perceived the operating costs to be inelastic with respect to accumulated mileage. It is
worth noting that Rust (1987) mentioned: “According to Zurcher, monthly maintenance
costs increase very slowly as a function of accumulated mileage.”
To get an idea for the effect of sampling error on our estimates, we bootstrapped
our estimation procedure. For each of 100 resamples, we randomly drew 80 buses with
replacement from the dataset, and re-estimated the utility flows u¯y=0(x) using our pro-
cedure. The results are plotted in Figure 4. The evidence suggests that we are able to
obtain fairly tight cost estimates for states where there is at least one replacement, i.e.
for x ≥ 9 (x ≥ 112, 500 miles), and for states that are reached often enough; i.e. for
x ≤ 22 (x ≤ 275, 000 miles).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how results from convex analysis can be fruitfully applied
to study identification in dynamic discrete choice models; modulo the use of these tools, a
26Operating costs include maintenance, fuel, insurance costs, plus Zurcher’s estimate of the costs of
lost ridership and goodwill due to unexpected breakdowns.
27To be pedantic, this also includes the operating cost at x = 0.
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Figure 4: Boostrapped estimates of utility flows u¯y=0(x)
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plot the values of the bootstrapped resampled estimates of u¯y=0(x). In each boxplot, the
central mark is the median, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the
whiskers extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles.
large class of dynamic discrete choice problems with quite general utility shocks becomes
no more difficult to compute and estimate than the Logit model encountered in most
empirical applications. This has allowed us to provide a natural and holistic framework
encompassing the papers of Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), and Magnac and Thes-
mar (2002). While the identification results in this paper are comparable to other results
in the literature, the approach we take, based on the convexity of the social surplus func-
tion G and the resulting duality between choice probabilities and choice-specific value
functions, appears new. Far more than providing a mere reformulation, this approach is
powerful, and has significant implications in several dimensions:
First, by drawing the (surprising) connection between the computation of the G∗
function and the computation of optimal matchings in the classical assignment game,
we can apply the powerful tools developed to compute optimal matchings to dynamic
discrete-choice models.28 Moreover, by reformulating the problem as an optimal matching
problem, all existence and uniqueness results are inherited from the theory of optimal
transport. For instance, the uniqueness of a systematic utility rationalizing the con-
28While the present paper has used standard Linear Programming algorithms such as the Simplex
algorithm, other, more powerful matching algorithms such as the Hungarian algorithm may be efficiently
put to use when the dimensionality of the problem grows.
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sumer’s choices follows from the uniqueness of a potential in the Monge-Kantorovich
theorem.
We believe the present paper opens a more flexible way to deal with discrete choice
models. While identification is exact for a fixed structure of the unobserved heterogene-
ity, one may wish to parameterize the distribution of the utility shocks and do inference
on that parameter. The results and methods developed in this paper may also extend to
dynamic discrete games, with the utility shocks reinterpreted as players’ private infor-
mation.29 However, we leave these directions for future exploration.
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Appendix A Background results
A.1 Convex Analysis for Discrete-choice Models
Here, we give a brief review of the main notions and results used in the paper. We
keep an informal style and do not give proofs, but we refer to Rockafellar (1970) for an
extensive treatment of the subject.
Let u ∈ R|Y| be a vector of utility indices. For utility shocks {εy}y∈Y distributed
according to a joint distribution function Q, we define the social surplus function as
G(u) = E[max
y
{uy + εy}], (23)
where uy is the y-th component of u. If E(εy) exists and is finite, then the function G
is a proper convex function that is continuous everywhere. Moreover assuming that Q
is sufficiently well-behaved (for instance, if it has a density with respect to the Lebesgue
measure), G is differentiable everywhere.
Define the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate, or convex conjugate of G as G∗(p) = supu∈R|Y|{p·
u − G(u)}. Clearly, G∗ is a convex function as it is the supremum of affine functions.
Note that the inequality
G(u) + G∗(p) ≥ p · u (24)
holds in general. The domain of G∗ consists of p ∈ R|Y| for which the supremum is
finite. In the case when G is defined by (23), it follows from Norets and Takahashi (2013)
that the domain of G∗ contains the simplex ∆|Y|, which is the set of p ∈ R|Y| such that
py ≥ 0 and
∑
y∈Y py = 1. This means that our convex conjugate function is always
well-defined.
The subgradient ∂G (u) of G at u is the set of p ∈ R|Y| such that
p · u− G(u) ≥ p · u′ − G(u′)
holds for all u′ ∈ R|Y|. Hence ∂G is a set-valued function or correspondence. ∂G (u) is a
singleton if and only if G(u) is differentiable at u; in this case, ∂G (u) = ∇G (u).
One sees that p ∈ ∂G (u) if and only if p · u − G(u) = G∗(p), that is if equality is
reached in inequality (24):
G(u) + G∗(p) = p · u. (25)
This equation is itself of interest, and is known in the literature as “Fenchel’s equality”.
By symmetry in (25), one sees that p ∈ ∂G (u) if and only if u ∈ ∂G∗(p). In particular,
when both G and G∗ are differentiable, then ∇G∗ = ∇G−1.
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Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the y-th component, corresponding to ∂G(w)
∂wy
:
∂G(w)
∂wy
=
∂
∂wy
∫
max
y
[wy + εy]dQ (26)
=
∫
∂
∂wy
max
y
[wy + εy]dQ (27)
=
∫
1(wy + εy ≥ wy′ + εy′), ∀y′ 6= y)dQ = p(y). (28)
(We have suppressed the dependence on x for convenience.)
Proof of Theorem 1. This follows directly from Fenchel’s equality (see Rockafellar (1970),
Theorem 23.5, see also Appendix A.1), which states that
p ∈ ∂G (w)
is equivalent to G (w) + G∗ (p) = ∑y pywy, which is equivalent in turn to
w ∈ ∂G∗ (p) .
Proof of Theorem 2. Because ε has full support, the choice probabilities p will lie strictly
in the interior of the simplex ∆|Y|. Let w˜ ∈ ∂G∗ (p), and let wy = w˜y − G (w˜). One
has G (w) = 0, and an immediate calculation shows that ∂G (w) = p. Let us now show
that w is unique. Consider w and w′ such that G (w) = G (w′) = 0, and p ∈ ∂G (w) and
p ∈ ∂G (w′). Assume w 6= w′ to get a contradiction; then there exist two distinct y0 and
y1 such that wy0 − wy1 6= w′y0 − w′y1 ; without loss of generality one may assume
wy0 − wy1 > w′y0 − w′y1 .
Let S be the set of ε’s such that
wy0 − wy1 > εy1 − εy0 > w′y0 − w′y1
wy0 + εy0 > max
y 6=y0,y1
wy + εy
w′y1 + εy1 > maxy 6=y0,y1
w′y + εy
Because ε has full support, S has positive probability.
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Let w¯ = w+w
′
2
. Because p ∈ ∂G (w) and p ∈ ∂G (w′), one has G (w¯) = 0, thus
0 = E
[
w¯Y (w¯,ε) + εY (w¯,ε)
]
=
1
2
E
[
wY (w¯,ε) + εY (w¯,ε)
]
+
1
2
E
[
w′Y (w¯,ε) + εY (w¯,ε)
]
≤ 1
2
E
[
wY (w,ε) + εY (w,ε)
]
+
1
2
E
[
w′Y (w′,ε) + εY (w′,ε)
]
=
1
2
(G (w) + G (w′)) = 0
Hence equality holds term by term, and
wY (w,ε) + εY (w,ε) = wY (w¯,ε) + εY (w¯,ε)
w′Y (w′,ε) + εY (w′,ε) = w
′
Y (w¯,ε) + εY (w¯,ε)
For ε ∈ S, Y (w, ε) = Y (w¯, ε) = y0 and Y (w′, ε) = Y (w¯, ε) = y1, and we get the
desired contradiction.
Hence w = w′, and the uniqueness of w follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. From G (w0) = 0 and ∂G (w − G (w)) = ∂G (w), and by the unique-
ness result in Theorem 2, it follows that
w0 = w − G (w) .
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is in Galichon and Salanie´ (2012), but we include it
here for self-containedness. This connection between the G∗ function and a matching
model follows from manipulation of the variational problem in the definition of G∗:
G∗ (p) = sup
w∈RY
{∑
y
pywy − EQ
[
max
y∈Y
(wy + εy)
]}
(29)
= sup
w∈RY

∑
y
pywy + EQ
[
min
y∈Y
(−wy − εy)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡z(ε)
 .
Defining c (y, ε) ≡ −εy, one can rewrite the above as
G∗ (p) = sup
wy+z(ε)≤c(y,ε)
{Ep [wY ] + EQ [z (ε)]} . (30)
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As is well-known from the results of Monge-Kantorovich (Villani (2003), Thm. 1.3), this
is the dual-problem for a mass transport problem. The corresponding primal problem is
G∗ (p) = min
Y∼p
ε∼Qˆ
E [c (Y, ε)]
which is equivalent to (16)-(18). Comparing Eqs. (29) and (30), we see that the subd-
ifferential ∂G∗(p) is identified with those elements w such that (w, z), for some z, solves
the dual problem (30).
Proof of Theorem 4. (i) follows from Proposition 2 and the fact that if wy + z (ε) ≤
c (y, ε), then Ep [wY ] + EQ [z (ε)] = G∗ (p) if and only if (w, z) is a solution to the dual
problem.
(ii) follows from the fact that −z (ε) = supy {wy − c (y, ε)} = supy {wy + εy}, thus
EQ [z (ε)] = 0 is equivalent to EQ
[
supy {wy + εy}
]
= 0, that is G (w) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 5. We shall show that the vector of choice-specific value functions de-
rived from the MTA estimation procedure, denoted wn, converges to the true vector w0.
In our procedure, there are two sources of estimation error. The first is the sampling
error in the vector of choice probabilities, denoted pn. The second is the simulation error
involved in the discretization of the distribution of ε; we let Qn denote this discretized
distribution.
A distinctive aspect of our proof is that it utilizes the theory of mass transport; namely
convergence results for sequences of mass transport problems. For y ∈ Y , let ιy denote the
|Y|-dimensional row vector with all zeros except a 1 in the y-th column. This discretized
mass transport problem from which we obtain wn is:
sup
γ∈M(Qn,pn)
∫
Rd×Rd
(ι · ε) γ(dε, dι) (31)
where M(Qn, pn) denotes the set of joint (discrete) probability measures with marginal
distributions Qn and pn. In the above, ι denotes a random vector which is equal to ιy
with probability pny , for y ∈ Y . The dual problem used in the MTA procedure is
inf
z,w
∫
z (ε) dQn (ε) +
∑
y
wyp
n
y : (32)
s.t. z(ε) ≥ ιy · ε− wy, ∀y, ∀ε (33)
Gn(wny ) = 0, (34)
where Gn(w) ≡ EQn(wy + y). We let (zn, wn) denote solutions to this discretized dual
problem (32). Recall (from the discussion in Section 2.3) that the extra constraint (34)
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in the dual problem just selects among the many dual optimizing arguments (wn, zn)
corresponding to the optimal primal solution γn, and so does not affect the primal prob-
lem.30
Next we derive a more manageable representation of this constraint (34). From
Fenchel’s Equality (Eq. (25)), we have
∑
y p
n
yw
n
y = Gn(wn) + G∗n(pn) = G∗n(pn) (with
G∗n defined as the convex conjugate function of Gn). Moreover, from Proposition 2, we
know that G∗n(pn) can be characterized as the optimized dual objective function in (32).
Hence, we see that the constraint Gn(wn) = 0 is equivalent to
∫
zn(ε)dQn(ε) = 0. We
introduce this latter constraint directly and rewrite the dual program
inf
z,w
∑
y
wyp
n
y +
∫
z (ε) dQn (ε) (35)
s.t. z(ε) ≥ ιy · ε− wy, ∀y, ∀ε (36)∫
z (ε) dQn (ε) = 0. (37)
We will demonstrate consistency by showing that (zn, wn) converge a.s. to the dual
optimizers in the “limit” dual problem, given by
inf
z,w
∑
y
wyp
0
y (38)
z(ε) ≥ ιy · ε− wy, ∀y, ∀ε (39)∫
z (ε) dQ = 0 (40)
We denote the optimizers in this limit problem by (w0, z0), where, by construction, w0
are the “true” values of the choice-specific value functions. The difference between the
discretized and limit dual problems is that Qn in the former has been replaced by Q, the
continuous distribution of ε, and the estimated choice probabilities pn have been replaced
by the limit p0.
We proceed in two steps. First, we argue that the sequence of optimized dual programs
(35) converges to the optimized limit dual program (38), a.s. Based upon this, we then
argue that the sequence of dual optimizers, (wn, zn), necessarily converge to their unique
limit optimizers, (w0, z0), a.s.
First step. By the Kantorovich duality theorem, we know that the optimized values
30We note that, as discussed before, the discreteness of Qn implies that (zn, wn) will not be uniquely
determined, as the core of the assignment game for a finite market is not a singleton. But this does not
affect the proof, as our arguments below hold for any sequence of selections {zn, wn}n.
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for the limit primal and dual programs coincide
sup
γ∈Π(Q0,p0)
∫
Rd×Rd
(ι · ε) γ(dε, dι) = inf
∑
y
wyp
0
y +
∫
z (ε) dQ. (41)
Moreover, both the primal and dual problems in the discretized case are finite-dimensional
linear programming problem, and by the usual LP duality, the optimal primal and dual
problems for the discretized case also coincide:∫
Rd×Rd
(ι · ε) γn(dε, dι) =
∑
y
wny p
n
y +
∫
zn (ε) dQn.
Given Assumption 1, and by Theorem 5.20 in Villani (2009), p. 77, we have that, up
to a subsequence extraction, γn (the optimizing argument of (31)) converges weakly. In
addition, by Theorem 5.30 in Villani (2009), the lefthand-ide of (41) has a unique solution
γ; hence, the sequence γn must converge generally to γ. This implies a.s. convergence of
the value of the primal problems:∫
Rd×Rd
(ι · ε) γn(dε, dι)→
∫
Rd×Rd
(ι · ε) γ(dε, dι), a.s.,
and, by duality, we must also have a.s. convergence of the discretized dual problem to
the limit problem:∑
y
wny p
n
y +
∫
zn (ε) dQn →
∑
y
wyp
0
y +
∫
z (ε) dQ, a.s. (42)
Second step. Next, we show that the discretized dual minimizers (zn, wn) converge
a.s. For convenience, in what follows we will suppress the qualifier “a.s.” from all the
statements below. Let
w
¯
n = min
y
wny . (43)
From examination of the dual problem (35), we see that zn is the piecewise affine
function
zn(ε) = max
y
{ιy · ε− wny}, (44)
thus zn is M -Lipschitz with M := maxy |ιy| = 1. Now observe that
zn(ε) + w
¯
n = max
y
{ιy · ε− wny + w¯
n} ≤ max
y
{ιy · ε} =: z(ε) (45)
and, letting y′ be the argument of the minimum in (43),
zn(ε) + w
¯
n ≥ ιy′ · ε− wny′ + w¯
n = ιy
′ · ε ≥ min
y
{ιy · ε} =: z(ε) (46)
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thus, by a combination of (45) and (46),
z(ε) ≤ zn(ε) + w
¯
n ≤ z(ε). (47)
By
∫
zn (ε) dQn (ε) = 0, we have that that w
¯
n is uniformly bounded (sublinear): for
some constant K, |zn(ε)| ≤ C(1 + |ε|) for every n and every ε. Hence the sequence zn is
uniformly equicontinuous, and converges locally uniformly up to a subsequence extraction
by Ascoli’s theorem. Let this limit function be denoted z0. By (42), and Theorem 2,
we deduce that z, the optimizer in the limit dual problem is unique31, so that it must
coincide with the limit function z0.
By the definition of (wn, zn) as optimizing arguments for (35), we have
∑
y w
n
y p
n
y ≤∑
y w¯
npy +
∫
[z (ε)]dQn (ε) or
∑
y
(
wny − w¯
n
)
pny ≤
∫
[z (ε)]dQn (ε) = EQnz
The second moment restrictions on Qn (condition (ii) in the theorem) imply that EQnz(ε)
exists and converges to EQz. Hence, the nonnegative vectors
(
wny − w¯
n
)
are bounded;
accordingly, the vectors
(
wny
)
are themselves bounded. This implies that wn converges
up to a subsequence to some limit point w∗, using the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. This
implies that
∑
y w
n
y p
n
y →
∑
y w
∗
ypy by bounded convergence. By Theorem 2, we know
that the limit point w∗ must coincide with w0, which is the unique optimizer in the dual
limit problem (38). Thus, we have shown that wn converges to w0, a.s.
31Although the support of ε is not bounded, the locally uniform convergence of zn and the fact that
the second moments of Qn are uniformly bounded are enough to conclude.
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Appendix C Additional Figures
Table 3
Design RMSE(y = 0) RMSE(y = 1) R2(y = 0) R2(y = 1)
N = 100, T = 100 0.5586 (3.7134) 0.2435 (0.1155) 0.3438 (0.7298) 0.7708 (0.2073)
N = 100, T = 500 0.1070 (0.0541) 0.1389 (0.0638) 0.7212 (0.2788) 0.9119 (0.0820)
N = 100, T = 1000 0.0810 (0.0376) 0.1090 (0.0425) 0.8553 (0.1285) 0.9501 (0.0352)
N = 200, T = 100 0.1244 (0.0594) 0.1642 (0.0628) 0.5773 (0.6875) 0.8736 (0.1112)
N = 200, T = 200 0.1177 (0.0736) 0.1500 (0.0816) 0.7044 (0.2813) 0.9040 (0.0842)
N = 500, T = 100 0.0871 (0.0375) 0.1162 (0.0430) 0.8109 (0.2468) 0.9348 (0.0650)
N = 500, T = 500 0.0665 (0.0261) 0.0829 (0.0290) 0.8899 (0.1601) 0.9678 (0.0374)
N = 1000, T = 100 0.0718 (0.0340) 0.0928 (0.0344) 0.8777 (0.1320) 0.9647 (0.0314)
N = 1000, T = 1000 0.0543 (0.0176) 0.0643 (0.0162) 0.9322 (0.0577) 0.9820 (0.0101)
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Figure 5: For each value of S, we plot the values of the differences maxw∈∂G∗(p) w1 −
minw∈∂G∗(p) w1 across all values of p ∈ ∆3. In the boxplot, the central mark is the median,
the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most
extreme data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually.
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Figure 6: For each value of S, we plot the values of the differences maxw∈∂G∗(p) w2 −
minw∈∂G∗(p) w2 across all values of p ∈ ∆3. In the boxplot, the central mark is the median,
the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most
extreme data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually.
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Figure 8
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x, mileage since last replacement (per 12,500 miles)
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
e
n
g
in
e
re
p
la
c
e
m
e
n
t
40
